



**트레이드 렌즈**  
TRADE LENS

Bringing investing into focus.

MACRO INSIGHT / No.01

Connecting macro conditions to business cash flow

# The Era of 5% U.S. 10-Year Treasury Yields

## Can the AI Boom Withstand High Rates?

How Treasury yields, credit terms and operating start dates are reshaping AI infrastructure investment

MARKET BENCHMARK

**10-year nominal 5.26% / real 2.91%**

U.S. Treasury · 29 Sep 2026 · distinct yield measures [\[1\]](#) [\[2\]](#)

**Growth can continue.**  
**Funding, execution and cash recovery face a tougher test.**

5% is neither a permanent-rate forecast nor a universal investment cutoff.

01 / RESEARCH VIEW

# The boom can endure. Not every investment will.

Continued AI growth and the financeability of an individual project are different questions.

## TradeLens view | Selective investment and concentration, rather than an abrupt end

A U.S. long-term yield above 5% is not a universal cutoff for AI investment. Businesses with **existing operating cash, committed funding, creditworthy customers and credible start dates** have more room to continue. Those relying on leverage, contract renewals and future residual values face a higher hurdle, even as demand grows.

| Business model                         | Directional view                                | What differentiates resilience                                              |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cash-generating platforms              | Greater relative capacity to sustain investment | Cash remaining after capital spending, leases and shareholder distributions |
| Contract-backed infrastructure         | Project-by-project selection                    | Customer credit, contract duration, cost pass-through, power and completion |
| Leverage / renewal-dependent operators | More sensitive to funding constraints           | Floating rates, the contract-debt maturity gap and re-leasing prices        |

This is a TradeLens business-model assessment, not a credit rating or a ranking of stocks. Company cash flows and financing agreements provide the evidence. [\[6\]](#)-[\[10\]](#)

## Why can investment continue while rates remain high?

Not all AI infrastructure buyers borrow on the same terms. Existing cash flow can bridge the gap between spending today and collecting revenue later. Demand for equipment, power and labor may also arrive before the benefits of higher productivity. Rising investment and high rates are not necessarily contradictory. [\[4\]](#)

## Three questions, not one

**Can the business grow? Can it secure funding? Can it recover its invested capital?** Revenue growth does not automatically answer the latter two questions. Nor does a large company-wide cash flow establish the standalone profitability of its AI business.

### Bottom line

The AI boom can withstand high rates. But the next round of investment is likely to favor **the ability to fund completion, begin operations on time and turn contracts into cash**, rather than the largest announced plan.

## 02 / RATE EVIDENCE


# At 5.26%, inflation expectations are not the whole story

Matched 10-year nominal and real par yields; the latest observation used is 29 September 2026.

The U.S. Treasury's 10-year nominal yield rose from 4.75% on 31 August to 5.26% on 29 September. The matched real yield increased from 2.44% to 2.91%. **Of the 51bp nominal increase, 47bp corresponds arithmetically to the real-yield move.** [1] [2]

| Same maturity / matched dates | 31 Aug | 29 Sep | Change |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| 10-year nominal par yield     | 4.75%  | 5.26%  | +51bp  |
| 10-year real par yield        | 2.44%  | 2.91%  | +47bp  |
| Simple nominal-real gap       | 2.31pp | 2.35pp | +4bp   |

## Change over the same period



Sources: U.S. Treasury [1] [2]; TradeLens calculations. 1bp=0.01 percentage point. Bars show changes over the same period, starting at zero. They are not three additive contributions.

## The present cost of future cash has increased

Infrastructure that recovers cash over many years is sensitive to a higher real opportunity cost of capital. However, the real-yield move cannot be attributed wholly to fiscal concerns, AI investment or the term premium. An arithmetic decomposition does not identify causation.

### Interpretation limit | The 2.35pp gap is not a pure inflation forecast

The simple difference between nominal and real par curves can reflect risk compensation, liquidity and curve-construction differences as well as inflation expectations. A real yield is neither the neutral policy rate nor the term premium itself. The point is that **“higher inflation explains everything” is insufficient.**

03 / TWO MACRO CLOCKS

# AI needs capital and power before its payoff arrives

Investment demand today and productivity gains tomorrow operate on different clocks.

On 16 September, the FOMC raised its target range by 25bp to **3.75–4.00%**. The current setting should therefore not be described as Fed cuts occurring alongside rising long yields. The policy rate is a short-term benchmark; the 10-year yield embeds expectations and risk compensation over a longer horizon. [\[3\]](#) [\[5\]](#)



In her 28 September speech, Fed Governor Lisa Cook described how AI investment can transmit price pressure through shared inputs such as construction labor and energy, while productivity-related disinflation arrives with a lag. These were the speaker's views, not a settled forecast of the entire FOMC. [\[4\]](#)

| Long-yield component                     | Connection to AI investment                                          | What cannot be inferred                                |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Expected short-rate path                 | Inflation, activity and policy reactions change financing conditions | AI alone does not predict the next policy decision     |
| Term / inflation risk compensation       | The price of long-duration funding and uncertainty                   | Not all of the 10-year rise is a term-premium increase |
| Treasury supply / private capital demand | The volume and terms of long-duration assets investors must absorb   | No arbitrary bp attribution to fiscal policy or AI     |

This is a conceptual decomposition. The term premium is a model-dependent estimate, not a directly observed yield. [\[5\]](#)

## Macro implication | Productivity optimism does not erase financing costs

A larger expected future saving may strengthen the incentive to invest now. But equipment and capital are needed before that benefit is realized. **AI's potential success and expensive capital can coexist.** That is the starting point of this report.

## 04 / FINANCING TRANSMISSION

# A 5% Treasury yield is not a company's borrowing rate

Identify the benchmark, credit spread, maturity and hedging terms before measuring the impact.

## The financing transmission chain

Market benchmark → credit and liquidity terms → contractual financing cost → project cash flow and investment decisions. Not every contract reprices against the 10-year Treasury yield.

| Financing type              | How a rate change is transmitted                                              | When it matters                               |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Existing fixed-rate debt    | The coupon may remain unchanged, while new debt and refinancing terms change  | Maturity, refinancing and expansion           |
| Floating-rate loans         | SOFR or another benchmark plus a contractual spread; hedges and floors matter | Rate resets and hedge expiry                  |
| New bonds / project finance | Maturity-specific benchmarks plus credit, collateral and covenant terms       | Issuance, commitment and drawdown             |
| Internal cash / equity      | No cash interest does not mean no opportunity cost or required return         | Project approval, expansion and distributions |

The general framework for corporate bond risk compensation draws on [12]. Benchmarks and fees in a specific loan remain contractual matters.

## Even one company does not borrow at a single rate

CoreWeave disclosed a floating tranche at **SOFR+2.25%** for its March DDTL 4.0 facility, versus **SOFR+5.50%** for its August DDTL 5.5 facility. [9] [10] Different dates, collateral, customers and structures prevent the 325bp difference from proving company-wide credit deterioration. Equally, “AI borrower” does not imply uniform funding terms.

## Demand can hold up while the pace of investment changes

Without sufficient price increases or more equity, a higher financing burden may prompt smaller projects, staged construction, asset sales or partner funding. That can represent a change in how demand is financed, rather than the disappearance of demand.

## What to check

**Which benchmark? When does it reset? Who bears higher costs? Is principal due before cash is recovered?**  
 A single 10-year yield cannot answer these questions.

## 05 / CASH FLOW CAPACITY

## Big tech's post-investment cash buffers differ


Microsoft and Meta: consolidated cash flows for the same calendar quarter, April–June 2026.

Cash generated by established businesses cushions investment when external capital becomes more selective. The comparison below subtracts only **cash purchases of property and equipment** from operating cash flow. It is neither standalone AI cash flow nor a comprehensive free-cash-flow comparison. [\[6\]](#) [\[7\]](#)

| April–June 2026 · USD bn           | Microsoft | Meta   |
|------------------------------------|-----------|--------|
| Cash from operations               | 55.441    | 31.862 |
| Cash PP&E spending                 | 35.802    | 30.116 |
| Difference between these two items | 19.639    | 1.746  |

### Operating cash less cash PP&E spending

USD bn



Microsoft FY26 Q4 and Meta 2Q26 both cover the three months ended 30 June. This reference calculation does not fully capture lease principal, other investments, distributions or changes in debt. [\[6\]](#) [\[7\]](#)

### Meta's 0.784bn and 1.746bn are not contradictory

Meta's reported FCF also deducts 0.962bn of finance-lease principal, producing **0.784bn**:  
 $31.862 - 30.116 - 0.962 = 0.784$ . [\[7\]](#) Comparing different definitions under the same "CAPEX" label can misstate funding capacity.

#### Assessment | Capacity to fund AI is not proof of AI returns

Quarterly cash differences also reflect seasonality and working capital. A large buffer supports investment continuity; it does not guarantee the return on new AI assets. **Even cash-rich businesses do not have unlimited investment capacity.**

## 06 / CREDIT &amp; CONTRACTS

# High EBITDA and long debt maturities do not eliminate risk

CoreWeave illustrates why AI demand and financing structure must be assessed together.

| CoreWeave · 2Q26     | USD bn | Nature of the measure                                                                   |
|----------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Revenue              | 2.575  | Revenue recognized for services in the quarter                                          |
| Adjusted EBITDA      | 1.510  | Company-adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization; non-GAAP |
| Operating result     | -0.049 | Quarterly accounting operating loss                                                     |
| Net interest expense | 0.640  | Accounting expense; distinct from cash interest paid                                    |

Source: company earnings release [8]. These are different earnings measures, not additive items. Adjusted EBITDA is not cash available to repay debt.

## Two different financings by the same company

| As announced         | March DDTL 4.0 [9]                               | August DDTL 5.5 [10]                                                       |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Facility size        | Up to USD 8.5bn                                  | USD 2.6bn                                                                  |
| Disclosed rate       | Floating SOFR+2.25%; fixed approximately 5.9%    | SOFR+5.50%                                                                 |
| Maturity / contracts | Matures March 2032; linked to customer contracts | Debt approximately five years; contracts average approximately three years |

Terms relate to different transactions. They do not imply full drawdown or identical customers, collateral, ratings or pricing dates.

## Longer debt does not remove customer renewal risk

The August facility allows renewal or re-leasing after the initial customer contracts expire. [10] The company's expectation that shorter contracts can command higher prices is different from those prices lasting through debt maturity. Asset economic life and subsequent demand still matter.

### Assessment | Financing availability is not completed capital recovery

These transactions establish that AI infrastructure financing is being provided. But facility size, EBITDA and long maturity do not erase risk. **Renewal prices, customer credit, equipment replacement and debt service** must hold together.



07 / PROJECT DEBT LAB

## At 8% versus 10% debt cost, required utilization rises from 87.1% to 92.1%

Illustrative model: how loan pricing narrows the range of financeable projects.


### Model A | Powered and cooled facility; GPU investment excluded

USD 1,000m investment; 500m debt repaid in ten level annual principal-and-interest payments. Full-use revenue: 300m/year; variable cash costs: 40% of revenue; fixed cash costs: 40m; maintenance: 20m. At utilization  $u$ ,  $CFADS=180u-60$ . The assumed debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) threshold is 1.30×

| Assumed loan rate | Annual debt service <sup>1</sup> | DSCR at 90% use | Use needed for 1.30× |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 6%                | 67.934                           | 1.50×           | 82.4%                |
| 8%                | 74.515                           | 1.37×           | 87.1%                |
| 10%               | 81.373                           | 1.25×           | 92.1%                |

### Utilization needed for 1.30× DSCR

% · illustrative



<sup>1</sup> USD m/year. Debt service  $A=500 \times r / [1 - (1+r)^{-10}]$ .  $DSCR=CFADS/A$ . Required  $u=(1.30 \times A + 60)/180$ . The 6%, 8% and 10% rates are assumptions, not Treasury yields or actual company borrowing rates.

### The responses: higher prices, less debt, lower costs or more use

At 90% utilization, annual cash available for debt service remains 102m. A 10% loan rate, however, fails the assumed 1.30× threshold. Cash generation has not disappeared; **the lender's headroom under the same capital structure has narrowed.**

### The question this calculation changes

After "Is demand growing?" comes "Do revenue and costs leave sufficient contractual repayment headroom?"  
**Higher rates can change allowable leverage and project terms before they eliminate demand.**

Taxes, working capital, fees, hedges, residual value and ramp-up are excluded. 1.30× is not a universal market requirement, and falling below it here does not establish an actual default.



## The cost a yield chart misses: delayed cash receipts

Illustrative model: separate a higher discount rate from an operating delay.


The IEA describes lead times of 5–15 years for planning, permitting and completing new grids, versus 1–3 years for data center construction. [11] This does not forecast delay at a specific site. It explains why completing a building and obtaining power may occur at different times.

### Model B | Invest 100 today; collect 16 each year, ten times

Pay 100 upfront; annual cash after operating costs and maintenance is 16. Collect ten times at year-ends 1–10 on time, or 2–11 after a one-year delay. The discount rate is an assumed project required return, not a loan or Treasury rate. Model A is separate.

| Assumed discount rate | On-time NPV | One-year-delay NPV |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| 8%                    | +7.36       | -0.59              |
| 10%                   | -1.69       | -10.62             |
| 12%                   | -9.60       | -19.28             |

### Project NPV by operating start date



Indexed units: initial investment=100.  $NPV = -100 + 16 \times [1 - (1+k)^{-10}] / k$ . Delay discounts the annuity by another  $(1+k)$ . Taxes, extra construction spending, financing costs and residual value are not separately included.

### The operating start date is a core economic variable

At an 8% discount rate, NPV is +7.36. Delaying receipts by one year alone takes it to -0.59. Additional construction or waiting costs would weaken the result further. Power availability, commissioning and customer acceptance are therefore economic variables, not merely technical milestones.

### Assessment | Earlier cash recovery matters at the same interest rate

Project NPV and a fair share price are different objects. This illustration explains the disadvantage of later cash flow; it does not value a real project or security.

## 09 / WHO ABSORBS THE COST

# Costs do not vanish. Contracts move them.

Strong technology and demand do not determine who bears higher financing costs.

An operator cannot automatically charge a customer more because rates have risen. Power, financing and delay costs depend on repricing, minimum payments, acceptance and warranties. The table is a **TradeLens contract-analysis framework** informed by disclosed transactions and cash flows, not an estimate of undisclosed clauses. [9] [10]

| Party                          | Potential source of opportunity                                          | Risk assumed in return                                        |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Well-funded customer           | Use funding, prepayments or long purchases to secure supply              | Unused capacity, its own demand and failed investment         |
| Infrastructure operator        | Cost pass-through or committed usage fees improve visibility             | Delays, customer credit, renewal prices and replacement       |
| Equipment / component supplier | Economic value of shorter lead times, efficiency and reliable acceptance | Wider warranties, longer collection periods and concentration |
| Lender / capital provider      | Risk-priced spreads and protective covenants                             | Default, lower collateral values and delayed recovery         |

## Customer prepayments are not free incremental profit

Collecting part of a future supply payment early can reduce initial borrowing. If it is deducted from later payments, total receipts have not increased. Priority supply, fixed prices or performance guarantees can exchange some funding relief for additional obligations.

## A long contract is only as useful as what it fixes

Fixed revenue with floating power and interest costs can still produce volatile margins. Broader cost pass-through and a creditworthy customer may offer greater resilience. Read **price, volume, cost, acceptance and renewal** together, not just the number of contract years.

### The combinations that define contract quality

**Fixed revenue + variable costs** can squeeze margins. **Minimum payments + strong customer credit** can support debt service. **High prices + short contracts** may look attractive today without securing post-renewal cash. The combination matters more than any single clause.

### Where value is captured


Cash alone does not ensure a win. Those able to replace missing funding or execution may gain bargaining power. But **realized costs and cash collection after signing** determine the ultimate benefit.

## 10 / KOREAN SUPPLY CHAIN

# For Korean suppliers, order quality matters more than the headline yield

Macro conditions reach suppliers through customer approvals, delivery schedules and payment terms.

Samsung Electro-Mechanics describes increased supply of higher-value AI/server substrates and data-center MLCCs; LG Electronics describes a cooling portfolio linked to facility design. [13] [14] These business connections are real. But a rise in total U.S. AI CAPEX does not justify an equal percentage increase in an individual Korean supplier's revenue.



Conceptual transmission; not a representation of any specific contract

| Supply segment / example                         | Macro transmission channel                                          | Evidence in company reporting                                       |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Substrates / MLCCs:<br>Samsung Electro-Mechanics | Platform spending approval → product adoption → production volume   | Approved products, good-unit shipments, mix and payment terms       |
| Cooling: LG Electronics                          | Facility funding and power → installation / acceptance → operations | Firm orders, delivery, acceptance, warranty cost and repeat orders  |
| Manufacturing / capacity investment              | Timing gap between expected customer volume and supplier expansion  | Existing/new utilization, depreciation, inventories and receivables |

Companies are examples of business exposure. No specific U.S. customer relationship, guaranteed order or share-price direction is assumed. [13] [14]

## Look for orders that survive and convert to cash

A funded customer and clear acceptance conditions provide stronger evidence than an expansion plan alone. Yet a long fixed-price contract leaves supplier cost risk, and slow payment turns sales growth into a working-capital burden. Revenue scale, margin and collection speed must be assessed together.

### Connection to earlier TradeLens research

Technical demand for substrates and MLCCs, or HVAC's growth path, is the starting point. This macro lens adds **customer financing → project operation → supplier cash recovery**. The gap between technical demand and economic outcomes becomes more important when capital is expensive.

## 11 / SCENARIO MATRIX

# Falling rates are not always good news

Condition the analysis on demand, spreads and start dates, not the direction of rates alone.

## Base case | Selective investment continues at high rates

The report favors continued investment where existing cash and customer contracts provide support, with pressure on projects that depend heavily on borrowing or uncertain start dates. This is a conditional business outlook, not a probability forecast or an index or yield target.

| Scenario                               | Conditions that occur together                                  | Implication for AI infrastructure                                                |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A. High rates, resilient demand        | Paid use and renewals hold up; credit markets remain accessible | Less leverage, staged development and differentiation rather than a blanket halt |
| B. Inflation / supply bottlenecks ease | Rates or spreads ease; power and equipment schedules improve    | Lower financing and delay risk at the same revenue level                         |
| C. Rates fall because demand weakens   | Usage and renewals deteriorate; credit spreads may widen        | Revenue, collateral and refinancing damage can outweigh benchmark relief         |
| D. Rates and input costs rise          | Higher power / construction costs with limited pass-through     | More pressure on unbuilt, fixed-price and low-utilization projects               |

## Evidence that would overturn the base case

If major buyers' operating cash weakens while cancellations, renewal-price declines and financing gaps broaden, the interpretation should move from selective continuation toward industry-wide investment retrenchment. Resilient paid use and renewals, coupled with easing cost and funding burdens, would instead strengthen conversion from growth into cash.

## Illustration | A lower benchmark can still mean more expensive debt

A 1pp decline in the benchmark combined with a 2pp increase in the spread raises the total borrowing rate by 1pp, all else equal. In a demand slowdown, separate discount-rate relief from weaker credit and revenue. This is arithmetic, not a rate forecast.

## Do not confuse a cycle adjustment with a structural break

Quarterly spending adjustments differ from a collapse in long-run demand. Lower rates do not automatically repair obsolete equipment or poor customer contracts. The favorable combination is **resilient demand, controlled costs, operating progress and cash collection**, not falling yields alone.

All scenarios are TradeLens analytical assumptions. They do not assert that an actual investment cut, credit event or company loss has occurred.

## 12 / OUTLOOK &amp; MONITORING

# In a 5% world, who can fund the project through to cash?

Move beyond the need for AI and test the continuity of funding, operation and recovery.

| What to monitor          | Evidence that strengthens the view                                     | Evidence that weakens it                                            |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Treasury / credit terms  | Stable real yields; maintained spreads and maturities on new financing | Higher yields, wider spreads and tighter collateral terms           |
| Buyer funding capacity   | Operating cash supports investment, leases and distributions           | Existing cash generation weakens relative to long-term commitments  |
| Customer contracts       | Credit quality, collection, renewals and sustained pricing             | Cancellations; short contracts against long debt / recovery periods |
| Operating start          | Power, commissioning, acceptance and billing connect                   | Power or acceptance delays persist after the building is complete   |
| Supplier cash conversion | Good-unit shipments, collection and cost / warranty control            | Inventory, receivables and warranty costs outgrow sales             |

## Final view | AI can grow, but capital's conditions get tougher

The observed yields, cash flows and facilities support neither “AI is rate-insensitive” nor “5% stops everything.” **Platforms with established cash generation and infrastructure with robust recovery structures have greater relative endurance.** Leverage- and renewal-dependent businesses may need to redesign their financing even when demand is strong.

### Four answers for the reader

**What is changing?** Large AI investment programs are proceeding at a higher real price of capital.

**Why does it matter?** The present value of future revenue and debt-service headroom decline.

**Who is affected?** Funding, contracts and execution determine the allocation of costs and bargaining power.

**What confirms it?** Use, renewals, power, acceptance, collection and actual financing terms must connect.

### The report's answer

**The AI boom can withstand high rates.** Not every announced project will. Projects with earlier cash receipts, funding matched to recovery timing and customers who return are more likely to lead the next phase.

Analysis date: 1 October 2026. Treasury comparisons use matched nominal and real yields through 29 September; company cash and earnings comparisons use the quarter ended 30 June. Trading calls, timing and fair or target prices are outside scope.



13 / SOURCE REGISTER

## Connect the evidence to the original source

Select a teal citation, a source title or “Open source” to open the original publication.

|                                                                                                                                                                                            |                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>01. U.S. Treasury   Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates</b><br>2026.08.31–09.29 · Nominal Treasury yields; maturity-specific par curves                                                | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>02. U.S. Treasury   Daily Treasury Par Real Yield Curve Rates</b><br>2026.08.31–09.29 · Real Treasury yields; dates matched to nominal series                                           | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>03. Federal Reserve   FOMC Statement</b><br>2026.09.16 · 25bp increase; federal funds target range of 3.75–4.00%                                                                        | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>04. Federal Reserve · Lisa D. Cook   An Update on AI and the Economy</b><br>2026.09.28 · AI investment, inflation and productivity lags; speaker's views                                | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>05. Federal Reserve Bank of New York   Do Expected, in addition to Spot, U.S. Treasury Term Premiums Matter?</b><br>2014.06 · Term-premium framework; not a current numerical estimate  | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>06. Microsoft   FY26 Q4 Earnings Release</b><br>2026.07.29 · Three months ended 30 June; operating cash and cash PP&E additions                                                         | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>07. Meta   Second Quarter 2026 Results</b><br>2026.07.29 · Quarterly cash flows; PP&E, lease principal and FCF reconciliation                                                           | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>08. CoreWeave   Second Quarter 2026 Results</b><br>2026.08.11 · Revenue, operating result, net interest expense and adjusted EBITDA                                                     | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>09. CoreWeave   \$8.5 Billion Financing Facility — DDTL 4.0</b><br>2026.03.31 · Floating tranche at SOFR+2.25%; fixed tranche at approximately 5.9%                                     | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>10. CoreWeave   \$2.6 Billion Loan Facility — DDTL 5.5</b><br>2026.08.10 · SOFR+5.50%; roughly five-year debt and three-year average contracts                                          | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>11. International Energy Agency   Electricity 2026 — Grids</b><br>2026 · Lead-time mismatch between grids and data centers                                                              | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>12. Federal Reserve Bank of New York   Estimating the Term Structure of Corporate Bond Risk Premia</b><br>2026.02.24 · Corporate bond rates and risk compensation; analytical framework | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>13. Samsung Electro-Mechanics   Second Quarter 2026 Results (Korean)</b><br>2026.07.30 · Business exposure of higher-value substrates and MLCCs                                         | <a href="#">Open source</a> |
| <b>14. LG Electronics   NVIDIA Preferred Partner for Power and Cooling Solutions</b><br>2026.09.28 · Cooling portfolio and integration with facility design; company release               | <a href="#">Open source</a> |

Source scope: nominal and real Treasury yields use matched dates; company cash flows use the same calendar quarter. Financing terms refer to individual facilities, not company-wide average funding costs. Speeches and company expectations are distinguished from realized outcomes.

# Methodology, disclaimer and use of this report

Distinguish facts, institutional and company views, TradeLens judgments and illustrative calculations.

| Item             | Basis                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dates and scope  | Analysis date: 1 October 2026. Treasury comparison dates: 31 August and 29 September. Company financials cover the three months ended 30 June; each financing reflects terms at its announcement.                    |
| Yield comparison | The nominal-real par-curve gap is reference arithmetic, not an estimate of pure inflation expectations, the neutral policy rate or the term premium.                                                                 |
| Cash-flow scope  | Microsoft and Meta: operating cash less cash PP&E purchases. This reference figure is before leases, other investment and distributions; it is neither AI-only cash nor standardized FCF.                            |
| Model A · page 8 | Facility investment, utilization, costs, ten-year debt and 1.30× DSCR are assumptions. GPUs, taxes, working capital, hedges, ramp-up and residual value are excluded.                                                |
| Model B · page 9 | Investment of 100, annual cash of 16, ten receipts, discount rates and a one-year delay are assumptions. This is separate from Model A; taxes, extra construction / financing costs and residual value are excluded. |
| Scope of service | Macroeconomics, business structure, growth and cash-flow analysis. No buy/sell recommendations, trading timing, fair or target share prices, or individualized investment advice.                                    |

1bp=0.01 percentage point. USD bn=billion U.S. dollars; USD m=million U.S. dollars. Calculations use underlying values and are rounded for display. Company non-GAAP measures follow company definitions. Models are not company forecasts. Charts and diagrams are recreated by TradeLens and do not imply source-institution approval or endorsement.

## Disclaimer

This report provides general information on macroeconomics, industries and the business structure, growth and profitability of companies. It does not provide buy or sell recommendations, trading timing, fair or target prices, or individualized investment advice. Information and analysis are as of the stated date; accuracy, completeness and continued currency are not guaranteed. Forward-looking views, estimates and illustrative calculations involve uncertainty and do not guarantee principal or investment returns.

Investment decisions remain the responsibility of the reader. Except where liability is established under applicable law, TradeLens is not liable for investment losses arising from use of this report.

## Copyright and restrictions on use

The text, charts, design, editing and structure of this report, insofar as TradeLens holds the relevant rights, are protected under applicable law. Other than personal reading and storage, no part may be modified, edited, translated, reprocessed, reproduced, transmitted, reposted, redistributed or sold without prior written consent. This restriction applies to free or paid distribution in any form, including files and screenshots. Removing logos, source citations or rights notices, or distributing the report under another party's name, is also prohibited.

Uses permitted by applicable law and the separate licensing terms of third-party materials remain subject to those provisions. For sharing, please use the report's official TradeLens publication-page link.